Thoughts Out of Season, Part II

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 87

of Rousseau's man, so far at any
rate as his hunger for life, his discontent and yearning, his
intercourse with the demons of the heart could be represented. But
what comes from these congregated storm-clouds? Not a single
lightning flash! And here begins the new Image of man--the man
according to Goethe. One might have thought that Faust would have
lived a continual life of suffering, as a revolutionary and a
deliverer, as the negative force that proceeds from goodness, as the
genius of ruin, alike religious and dæmonic, in opposition to his
utterly undæmonic companion; though of course he could not be free of
this companion, and had at once to use and despise his evil and
destructive scepticism--which is the tragic destiny of all
revolutionary deliverers. One is wrong, however, to expect anything
of the sort: Goethe's man here parts company with Rousseau's; for he
hates all violence, all sudden transition--that is, all action: and
the universal deliverer becomes merely the universal traveller. All
the riches of life and nature, all antiquity--arts, mythologies and
sciences--pass before his eager eyes, his deepest desires are aroused
and satisfied, Helen herself can hold him no more--and the moment
must come for which his mocking companion is waiting. At a fair spot
on the earth, his flight comes to an end: his pinions drop, and
Mephistopheles is at his side. When the German ceases to be Faust,
there is no danger greater than of becoming a Philistine and falling
into the hands of the devil--heavenly powers alone can save him.
Goethe's man is, as I said, the contemplative man in the grand style,
who is only kept from dying of ennui by feeding on all the great and
memorable things that have ever existed, and by living from desire to
desire. He is not the active man; and when he does take a place among
active men, as things are, you may be sure that no good will come of
it (think, for example, of the zeal with which Goethe wrote for the
stage!); and further, you may be sure that "things as they are" will
suffer no change. Goethe's man is a conciliatory and conservative
spirit, though in danger of degenerating into a Philistine, just as
Rousseau's man may easily become a Catiline. All his virtues would be
the better by the addition of a little brute force and elemental
passion. Goethe appears to have seen where the weakness and danger of
his creation lay, as is clear from Jarno's word to Wilhelm Meister:
"You are bitter and ill-tempered--which is quite an excellent thing:
if you could once become

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Text Comparison with Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits

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"The dead still live: for they appear to the living in dreams.
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In reality they are streams with a hundred sources and tributaries.
Page 17
Later, indeed, he acquires distrust of the whole metaphysical method of explaining things: he then perceives, perhaps, that those effects could have been attained just as well and more scientifically by another method: that physical and historical explanations would, at least, have given that feeling of freedom from personal responsibility just as well, while interest in life and its problems would be stimulated, perhaps, even more.
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This evinces much simplicity--as if any individual could determine off hand what course of conduct would conduce to the welfare of humanity, and what course of conduct is preeminently desirable! This is a theory like that of freedom of competition, which takes it for granted that the general harmony [of things] _must_ prevail of itself in accordance with some inherent law of betterment or amelioration.
Page 33
A step further is taken, and the predication good or bad is no longer made of the particular motives but of the entire nature of a man, out of which motive grows as grow the plants out of the soil.
Page 36
If, notwithstanding, one of the good individuals does something unworthy of his goodness, recourse is had to exorcism; thus the guilt is ascribed to a deity, the while it is declared that this deity bewitched the good man into madness and blindness.
Page 40
Hence the child has faith in the judgments of its elders, the Christian in the assertions of the founder of the church.
Page 44
For the motives and the intentions are seldom sufficiently apparent, and amid them the memory itself seems to become clouded by the results of the act, so that a man often ascribes the wrong motives to his acts or regards the remote motives as the direct ones.
Page 47
We all feel, when the difference between ourselves and some other being is exceedingly great, that no element of injustice can be involved, and we kill a fly with no qualms of conscience whatever.
Page 50
--To this extent there is also a law between slaves and masters, limited only by the extent to which the slave may be useful to his master.
Page 58
Something that comes to someone as his own is neither a punishment nor a reward.
Page 59
If, on a sudden, the entire movement of the world stopped short, and an all knowing and reasoning intelligence were there to take advantage of this pause, he could foretell the future of every being to the remotest ages and indicate the path that would be taken in the world's further course.
Page 60
Many acts are called bad that are only stupid, because the degree of intelligence that decided for them was low.
Page 64
The idea dawns first upon the ancient Greeks, that is to say in a very late period of humanity, in the conception of a Moira [fate] ruling over the gods.
Page 67
Man, even in very inferior degrees of civilization, does not stand in the presence of nature as a helpless slave, he is not willy-nilly the absolute servant of nature.
Page 73
But he compares himself with a being who alone must be capable of the conduct that is called unegoistic and of an enduring consciousness of unselfish motive, with God.
Page 75
There still apparently remains that discouragement which is closely allied with fear of the punishment of worldly justice or of the contempt of one's fellow men.
Page 77
If one's morality be judged according to one's capacity for great, self sacrificing resolutions and abnegations (which when continual, and made a habit are known as sanctity) one is, in affection, or disposition, the most moral: while higher excitement supplies wholly new impulses which, were one calm and cool as ordinarily, one would not deem oneself even capable of.
Page 82
The distorted and diseased in his own nature with its blending of spiritual poverty, defective knowledge, ruined health, overwrought nerves, remained as hidden from his view as from the view of his beholders.
Page 83
--In the same manner I have viewed the saints of India who occupy an intermediate station between the christian saints and the Greek philosophers and hence are not to be regarded as a pure type.