The Will to Power, Book I and II An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values

By Friedrich Nietzsche

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in order to believe in
a power that erases faults: we immoralists prefer to disbelieve
in "faults." We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are
identically the same at root; just as deeds which turn _against_ us
may be useful from an economical point of view, and even _generally
desirable._ In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well
have been _spared_ a given action; the circumstances alone predisposed
us in its favour. Which of us, if _favoured_ by circumstances, would
not already have committed every possible crime?... That is why one
should never say: "Thou shouldst never have done such and such a
thing," but only: "How strange it is that I have not done such and
such a thing hundreds of times already!"--As a matter of fact, only
a very small number of acts are _typical_ acts and real epitomes of
a personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are
personalities, a single act very rarely _characterises_ a man. Acts
are mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely
reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the
depths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter. A fit of
temper, a gesture, a blow with a knife: how little of the individual
resides in these acts!--A deed very often brings a sort of stupor or
feeling of constraint in its wake: so that the agent feels almost
spellbound at its recollection, or as though he _belonged to it,_
and were not an independent creature. This mental disorder, which is
a form of hypnotism, must be resisted at all costs: surely a single
deed, whatever it be, when it is compared with all one has done, is
_nothing,_ and may be deducted from the sum without making the account
wrong. The unfair interest which society manifests in controlling the
whole of our lives in one direction, as though the very purpose of its
existence were to cultivate a certain individual act, should not infect
the man of action: but unfortunately this happens almost continually.
The reason of this is, that every deed, if followed by unexpected
consequences, leads to a certain mental disturbance, no matter whether
the consequences be good or bad. Behold a lover who has been given a
promise, or a poet while he is receiving applause from an audience:
as far as _intellectual torpor_ is concerned, these men are in no way
different from the anarchist who is suddenly confronted by a detective
bearing a search warrant.

There are some acts which are _unworthy_ of us: acts which, if they
were regarded

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Text Comparison with Early Greek Philosophy & Other Essays Collected Works, Volume Two

Page 4
" Labour is a disgrace, because existence has no value in itself; but even though this very existence in the alluring embellishment of artistic illusions shines forth and really seems to have a value in itself, then that proposition is still valid that labour is a disgrace--a disgrace indeed by the fact that it is impossible for man, fighting for the continuance of bare existence, to become an _artist.
Page 8
By the indefinable greatness and power of such conquerors the spectator feels, that they are only the means of an intention manifesting itself through them and yet hiding itself from them.
Page 18
us--as I am forced to insert here in opposition to Schopenhauer--after a most rigid self-examination, not according to its essence but merely as conception; and we may well be permitted to say, that even Schopenhauer's "Will" is nothing else but the most general phenomenal form of a Something otherwise absolutely indecipherable.
Page 20
" I do not agree with that; the more subtle or powerful stirring-up of that pleasure-and-displeasure-subsoil is in the realm of productive art _the_ element which is inartistic in itself; indeed only its total exclusion makes the complete self-absorption and disinterested perception of the artist possible.
Page 24
The opera as a species of art according to that concept is therefore not only an aberration of music, but an erroneous conception of æsthetics.
Page 25
In this sense it is true the opera is, at its best, good music, and nothing but music: whereas the jugglery performed at the same time is, as it were, only a fantastic disguise of the orchestra, above all, of the most important instruments the orchestra has: the.
Page 28
It gives us a peep into the abysses of hatred.
Page 57
,_ only a Becoming? Anaximander had fled just from these definite qualities into the lap of the metaphysical "Indefinite"; because the former _became_ and passed, he had denied them a true and essential existence; however should it not seem now as if the Becoming is only the looming-into-view of a struggle of eternal qualities? When we speak of the Becoming, should not the original cause of this be sought in the peculiar feebleness of human cognition--whereas in the nature of things there is perhaps no Becoming, but only a co-existing of many true increate indestructible realities? These are Heraclitean loop-holes and labyrinths; he exclaims once again: "The 'One' is the 'Many'.
Page 64
Both sought a way out from that contrast and divergence of a dual order of the world.
Page 65
another, and believed that they were not all of the same kind, but ought to be classified under two headings.
Page 68
It is true, as he recollected, the whole great mass of men judge with the same perversity; he himself has only participated in the general crime against logic.
Page 72
12 The other idea, of greater import than that of the "Existent," and likewise invented already by Parmenides, although not yet so clearly applied as by his disciple Zeno is the idea of the Infinite.
Page 73
" Achilles cannot catch up the tortoise which has a small start in a race, for in order to reach only the point from which the tortoise began, he would have had to run through innumerable, infinitely many spaces, viz.
Page 75
We call these _argumenta ad hominem:_ The Objection Of The Mobile Reason and that of The Origin Of Appearance.
Page 81
us otherwise than they really are, then one would not be able to advance any solid proposition about them, and therefore would not be able to accomplish any gnosiology or any "transcendental" investigation of objective validity.
Page 94
Page 98
And, moreover, what after all are those conventions op language? Are they possibly products of knowledge, of the love of truth; do the designations and the things coincide? Is language the adequate expression of all realities? Only by means of forgetfulness can man ever arrive at imagining that he possesses "truth" in that degree just indicated.
Page 100
Now man of course forgets that matters are going thus with him; he therefore lies in that fashion pointed out unconsciously and according to habits of centuries' standing--and by _this very unconsciousness,_ by this very forgetting, he arrives at a sense for truth.
Page 103
The very relation of a nerve-stimulus to the produced percept is in itself no necessary one; but if the same percept has been reproduced millions of times and has been the inheritance of many successive generations of man, and in the end appears each time to all mankind as the result of the same cause, then it attains finally for man the same importance as if it were _the_ unique, necessary percept and as if that relation between the original nerve-stimulus and the percept produced were a close relation of causality: just as a dream eternally repeated, would be perceived and judged as though real.
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