The Twilight of the Idols - The Antichrist Complete Works, Volume Sixteen

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 17

avenging ourselves on this life with the
phantasmagoria of "another," of a "better" life.

_Proposition Four._ To divide the world into a "true" and an "apparent"
world, whether after the manner of Christianity or of Kant (after all
a Christian in disguise), is only a sign of decadence,--a symptom of
_degenerating_ life. The fact that the artist esteems the appearance
of a thing higher than reality, is no objection to this statement For
"appearance" signifies once more reality here, but in a selected,
strengthened and corrected form. The tragic artist is no pessimist,--he
says _Yea_ to everything questionable and terrible, he is Dionysian.


[1] Nietzsche here refers to the concept "free will" of the Christians;
this does not mean that there is no such thing as will--that is to say
a powerful determining force from within.--TR.


HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" ULTIMATELY BECAME A FABLE

THE HISTORY OF AN ERROR

1. The true world, attainable to the sage, the pious man and the man of
virtue,--he lives in it, _he is it._

(The most ancient form of the idea was relatively clever,
simple, convincing. It was a paraphrase of the proposition
"I, Plato, am the truth.")


2. The true world which is unattainable for the moment, is promised to
the sage, to the pious man and to the man of virtue ("to the sinner who
repents").

(Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, more
insidious, more evasive,--It _becomes a woman,_ it becomes
Christian.)


3. The true world is unattainable, it cannot be proved, it cannot
promise anything; but even as a thought, alone, it is a comfort, an
obligation, a command.

(At bottom this is still the old sun; but seen through mist
and scepticism: the idea has become sublime, pale, northern,
Königsbergian.)[1]


4. The true world--is it unattainable? At all events it is unattained.
And as unattained it is also _unknown._ Consequently it no longer
comforts, nor saves, nor constrains: what could something unknown
constrain us to?

(The grey of dawn. Reason stretches itself and yawns for the
first time. The cock-crow of positivism.)


5. The "true world"--an idea that no longer serves any purpose, that
no longer constrains one to anything,--a useless idea that has become
quite superfluous, consequently an exploded idea: let us abolish it!

(Bright daylight; breakfast; the return of common sense
and of cheerfulness; Plato

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CONTENTS PAGE EDITORIAL NOTE vii PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 1 JEST, RUSE AND REVENGE: A PRELUDE IN RHYME 11 BOOK FIRST .
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32.
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16.
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The truth, however, is that they need quietness externally, because internally they have disquietude and labour.
Page 68
It perhaps distinguishes the Asiatics above the Europeans, that they are capable of a longer and profounder repose; even their narcotics operate slowly and require patience, in contrast to the obnoxious suddenness of the European poison, alcohol.
Page 75
Their inventions might then be more refined, and their gratifications might sound like good music: while at present they fill the world with their cries of distress, and consequently too often with the _feeling of distress_ in the first place! They do not know what to make of themselves—and so they paint the misfortune of others on the wall; they always need others! And always again other others!—Pardon me, my friends, I have ventured to paint my _happiness_ on the wall.
Page 85
It is thus only that we get beyond some of the paltry details in ourselves! Without that art we should be nothing but fore-ground, and would live absolutely under the spell of the perspective which makes the closest and the commonest seem immensely large and.
Page 101
" Or his immortal doctrines of the intellectuality of intuition, the apriority of the law of causality, the instrumental nature of the intellect, and the non-freedom of the will? No, nothing of this enchants, nor is felt as enchanting; but Schopenhauer's mystical embarrassments and shufflings in those passages where the matter-of-fact thinker allowed himself to be seduced and corrupted by the vain impulse to be the unraveller of the world's riddle: his undemonstrable doctrine of _one will_ ("all causes are merely occasional causes of the phenomenon of the will at such a time and at such a place," "the will to live, whole and undivided, is present in every being, even in the smallest, as perfectly as in the sum of all that was, is, and will be"); his _denial of the individual_ ("all lions are really only one lion," "plurality of individuals is an appearance," as also _development_ is only an appearance: he calls the opinion of Lamarck "an ingenious, absurd error"); his fantasy about _genius_ ("in æsthetic contemplation the individual is no longer an individual, but a pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge," "the subject, in that it entirely merges in the contemplated object, has become this object itself"); his nonsense about _sympathy_, and about the outburst of the _principium individuationis_ thus rendered possible, as the source of all morality; including also such assertions as, "dying is really the design of existence," "the possibility should not be absolutely denied that a magical effect could proceed from a person already dead":—these, and similar _extravagances_ and vices of the philosopher, are always first accepted and made articles of faith; for vices and extravagances are always easiest to imitate, and do not require a long preliminary practice.
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"All that still smacks more of Spinoza than of me,"—Schopenhauer would probably have said.
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I mean to say that philology presupposes a noble belief,—that for the benefit of some few who are always "to come," and are not there, a very great amount of painful, and even dirty labour has to be done beforehand: it is all labour _in usum Delphinorum_.
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Under the dominance of religious thoughts we have accustomed ourselves to the idea of "another (back, under, or upper) world," and feel an uncomfortable void and privation through the annihilation of the religious illusion;—and then "another world" grows out of this feeling once more, but now it is only a metaphysical world, and no longer a religious one.
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178.
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One sees that science also rests on a belief: there is no science at all "without premises.
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We seek for words; we seek perhaps also for ears.
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347.
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For you know well enough that all great modern artists suffer from bad consciences?.
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For what, then? For our unbelief? For all sorts of unbelief? Nay, you know better than that, my friends! The hidden _Yea_ in you is stronger than all the Nays and Perhapses, of which you and your age are sick; and when you are obliged to put out to sea, you emigrants, it is—once more a _faith_ which urges you thereto!.
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And listen to what I have found In the South! * * * "You are merry lovers and false and gay, In frolics and sport you pass the day; Whilst in the North, I shudder to say, I worshipped a woman, hideous and gray, Her name was Truth, so I heard them say, But I left her there and I flew away To the South!" BEPPA THE PIOUS.
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Variations in hyphenation and compound words have been preserved.