On the Future of our Educational Institutions

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 79

that other crowd of
indifferent natures does not count at all, natures that delight in
their freedom in a purely barbaric sense. For these latter show by
their base smugness and their narrow professional limitations that
this is the right element for them: against which there is nothing to
be said. Their comfort, however, does not counter-balance the
suffering of one single young man who has an inclination for culture
and feels the need of a guiding hand, and who at last, in a moment of
discontent, throws down the reins and begins to despise himself. This
is the guiltless innocent; for who has saddled him with the
unbearable burden of standing alone? Who has urged him on to
independence at an age when one of the most natural and peremptory
needs of youth is, so to speak, a self-surrendering to great leaders
and an enthusiastic following in the footsteps of the masters?

"It is repulsive to consider the effects to which the violent
suppression of such noble natures may lead. He who surveys the
greatest supporters and friends of that pseudo-culture of the present
time, which I so greatly detest, will only too frequently find among
them such degenerate and shipwrecked men of culture, driven by inward
despair to violent enmity against culture, when, in a moment of
desperation, there was no one at hand to show them how to attain it.
It is not the worst and most insignificant people whom we afterwards
find acting as journalists and writers for the press in the
metamorphosis of despair: the spirit of some well-known men of letters
might even be described, and justly, as degenerate studentdom. How
else, for example, can we reconcile that once well-known 'young
Germany' with its present degenerate successors? Here we discover a
need of culture which, so to speak, has grown mutinous, and which
finally breaks out into the passionate cry: I am culture! There,
before the gates of the public schools and universities, we can see
the culture which has been driven like a fugitive away from these
institutions. True, this culture is without the erudition of those
establishments, but assumes nevertheless the mien of a sovereign; so
that, for example, Gutzkow the novelist might be pointed to as the
best example of a modern public school boy turned aesthete. Such a
degenerate man of culture is a serious matter, and it is a horrifying
spectacle for us to see that all our scholarly and journalistic
publicity bears the stigma of this degeneracy upon it. How else can we
do justice to our learned men, who pay untiring attention to, and even

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Text Comparison with The Will to Power, Book I and II An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values

Page 13
_ Its opposite would be _weary_ Nihilism, which no longer attacks: its most renowned form being Buddhism: as _passive_ Nihilism,.
Page 33
(The psychology of the father-confessor and puritanical psychology--two forms of psychological romanticism: but also their counter-stroke, the attempt to maintain a purely artistic attitude towards "men"--but even in this respect no one dares to make the _opposite_ valuation.
Page 43
seventeenth century.
Page 47
The Germans _are_ not yet anything, but they are _becoming_ something; that is why they have not yet any culture;--that is why they cannot yet have any culture!--They are not yet anything: that means they are all kinds of things.
Page 57
Page 65
It is therefore _not_ a national religion, _not_ determined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it consists of a foundation of resentment against all that is successful and dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation of everything successful and dominant.
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) 174.
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What a terrible glow of false colouring here floods the meanest virtues--as though they were the reflection of divine qualities! The _natural_ purpose and utility of every virtue is systematically _hushed up_; it can only be valuable in the light of a _divine_ command or model, or in the light of the good which belongs to a beyond or a spiritual world.
Page 106
Page 111
_The predominance of moral values.
Page 121
(Thus pain was robbed of its innocence.
Page 123
This sacrifice is great: but such an end.
Page 128
I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_ from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a _personal_ virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally _forbidden_: virtue as I understand it is the actual _vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtù_--free from all moralic acid.
Page 131
It savours of antiquity and of old fashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw refined people and to make them inquisitive--in short, it affects us like a vice.
Page 152
Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a _fundamentally different valuation.
Page 158
Page 169
What one _wants_ to do, above all, is to disclaim all authority and to attribute it to _circumstances.
Page 171
_--One should not affect the spirit of science, when the time to be scientific is not yet at hand; but even the genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and has to affect a certain kind of method which is not yet seasonable.