Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1 Complete Works, Volume Six

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 58

to preserve or defend themselves,
to prevent personal injury; they lie where cunning and dissimulation
are the right means of self-preservation. _Intentional injury,_ when
our existence or safety (preservation of our comfort) is concerned, is
conceded to be moral; the State itself injures, according to this point
of view, when it punishes. In unintentional injury, of course, there
can be nothing immoral, that is ruled by chance. Is there, then, a kind
of intentional injury where our existence or the preservation of our
comfort is _not_ concerned? Is there an injuring out of pure _malice,_
for instance in cruelty? If one does not know how much an action hurts,
it is no deed of malice; thus the child is not malicious towards the
animal, not evil; he examines and destroys it like a toy. But _do_ we
ever know entirely how an action hurts another? As far as our nervous
system extends we protect ourselves from pain; if it extended farther,
to our fellow-men, namely, we should do no one an injury (except in
such cases as we injure ourselves, where we cut ourselves for the
sake of cure, tire and exert ourselves for the sake of health). We
_conclude_ by analogy that something hurts somebody, and through memory
and the strength of imagination we may suffer from it ourselves. But
still what a difference there is between toothache and the pain (pity)
that the sight of toothache calls forth! Therefore, in injury out of
so-called malice the _degree_ of pain produced is always unknown to
us; but inasmuch as there is _pleasure_ in the action (the feeling of
one's own power, one's own strong excitement), the action is committed,
in order to preserve the comfort of the individual, and is regarded,
therefore, from a similar point of view as defence and falsehood in
necessity. No life without pleasure; the struggle for pleasure is the
struggle for life. Whether the individual so fights this fight that
men call him good, or so that they call him evil, is determined by the
measure and the constitution of his _intellect._


105.

RECOMPENSING JUSTICE.--Whoever has completely comprehended the doctrine
of absolute irresponsibility can no longer include the so-called
punishing and recompensing justice in the idea of justice, should this
consist of giving to each man his due. For he who is punished does
not deserve the punishment, he is only used as a means of henceforth
warning away from certain actions; equally so, he who is rewarded
does not merit this reward, he could not act otherwise than he did.
Therefore the reward is meant only as an encouragement to him

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Text Comparison with The Will to Power, Book III and IV An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values

Page 2
With the question of Truth we find Nietzsche quite as ready to uphold his thesis as with all other questions.
Page 18
" The prerequisites of all living things and of their lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should be possible to pass definite judgments on things, and that _there should be no doubt_ at all concerning all essential values.
Page 39
" Or, better still; "_it is worth_" is actually what is meant by _"it is"_ or by "that is.
Page 73
" Conversely, even those philosophers and theologians, who in their logic and piety found the most imperative reasons for regarding their body as a deception (and even as a deception overcome and disposed of), could not help recognising the foolish fact that the body still remained: and the most unexpected proofs of this are to be found partly in Pauline and partly in Vedantic philosophy.
Page 92
But in very sudden accidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs appreciably earlier than the feeling of pain.
Page 117
The same holds good of the work of art: people are not satisfied with it alone, they must praise the artist.
Page 125
A clean conscience must be restored to the evil man--has this been my involuntary endeavour all the time? for I take as the evil man him who is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the convicts in prison should be referred to here).
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.
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.
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Victor Hugo did something very similar for language: but already people in France are asking themselves, in regard to the case of Victor Hugo, whether language was not corrupted by him, whether reason, intellectuality, and thorough conformity to law in language are not suppressed when the sensuality of expression is elevated to a high place? Is it not a sign of decadence that the poets.
Page 154
e.
Page 163
_The misunderstanding of egoism:_ on the part of _ignoble natures_ who know nothing of the lust of conquest and the insatiability of great love, and who likewise know nothing of the overflowing feelings of power which make a man wish to overcome things, to force them over to himself, and to lay them on his heart, the power which impels an artist to his material.
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effects.
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885.
Page 175
(_Dîners chez Magny:_ all intellectual gourmets with spoilt stomachs.
Page 184
The only nobility is that of birth and blood.
Page 192
The man of faith, the believer, is necessarily an inferior species of man.
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.
Page 209
A teaching which puts an end to such a condition by the fact that it _commands_ something: a transvaluation of values by means of which the accumulated forces are given a channel, a direction, so that they explode into deeds and flashes of lightning-does not in the least require to be a hedonistic teaching: in so far as it _releases strength_ which was compressed to an agonising degree, it brings happiness.
Page 211
The more modern man has exercised his idealising power in regard to a _God_ mostly by _moralising the latter_ ever more and more--what does that mean?--nothing good, a diminution in man's strength.