Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1 Complete Works, Volume Six

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 57

all evil actions committed by men against men, we
are desirous of obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain; in any case it is
always a question of self-preservation. Socrates and Plato are right:
whatever man does he always does well, that is, he does that which
seems to him good (useful) according to the degree of his intellect,
the particular standard of his reasonableness.


103.

THE HARMLESSNESS OF MALICE.--The aim of malice is _not_ the suffering
of others in itself, but our own enjoyment; for instance, as the
feeling of revenge, or stronger nervous excitement. All teasing,
even, shows the pleasure it gives to exercise our power on others and
bring it to an enjoyable feeling of preponderance. Is it _immoral_ to
taste pleasure at the expense of another's pain? Is malicious joy[3]
devilish, as Schopenhauer says? We give ourselves pleasure in nature
by breaking off twigs, loosening stones, fighting with wild animals,
and do this in order to become thereby conscious of our strength. Is
the knowledge, therefore, that another suffers through us, the same
thing concerning which we otherwise feel irresponsible, supposed to
make us immoral? But if we did not know this we would not thereby have
the enjoyment of our own superiority, which can only _manifest_ itself
by the suffering of others, for instance in teasing. All pleasure
_per se_ is neither good nor evil; whence should come the decision
that in order to have pleasure ourselves we may not cause displeasure
to others? From the point of view of usefulness alone, that is, out
of consideration for the _consequences,_ for _possible_ displeasure,
when the injured one or the replacing State gives the expectation of
resentment and revenge: this only can have been the original reason
for denying ourselves such actions. _Pity_ aims just as little at
the pleasure of others as malice at the pain of others _per se._ For
it contains at least two (perhaps many more) elements of a personal
pleasure, and is so far self-gratification; in the first place as the
pleasure of emotion, which is the kind of pity that exists in tragedy,
and then, when it impels to action, as the pleasure of satisfaction
in the exercise of power. If, besides this, a suffering person is
very dear to us, we lift a sorrow from ourselves by the exercise of
sympathetic actions. Except by a few philosophers, pity has always been
placed very low in the scale of moral feelings, and rightly so.


104.

SELF-DEFENCE.--If self-defence is allowed to pass as moral, then almost
all manifestations of the so-called immoral egoism must also stand;
men injure, rob, or kill in order

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Text Comparison with The Will to Power, Book III and IV An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values

Page 28
_ In order to establish the _a priori_ character (the pure rationality) of mathematical axioms, space _must be conceived as a form of pure reason.
Page 44
The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a sign of _progress_: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads Goethe--in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is felt as being upon a lower plane.
Page 54
_ Problem: why has the _image of the other world_ always been to the disadvantage of "this" one--that is to say, always stood as a criticism of it; what does this point to?-- A people that are proud of themselves, and who are on the ascending path of Life, always; picture _another_ existence as lower and less valuable than theirs; they regard the strange unknown world as their enemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity, but rather repugnance in regard to what is strange to them.
Page 60
The annihilation of ideals, the new desert waste the new arts which will help us to endure it--_amphibia_ that we are! _First principles,_ bravery, patience, no "stepping-back," not too much ardour to get to the fore.
Page 81
_ The organic ascends to higher regions.
Page 115
_ in order to be free.
Page 131
_ To regard a thing as beautiful is necessarily to regard it falsely (that is why incidentally love marriages are from the social point of view the most unreasonable form of matrimony).
Page 137
Precisely on this account he is great as an actor _i_ all these poor will-less people, whom doctors study so profoundly, astound one through their virtuosity in mimicking, in transfiguration, in their assumption of almost any character required.
Page 144
What good can come of all extension in the means of expression, when that which is expressed, art itself, has lost all its law and order? The picturesque pomp and power of tones, the symbolism of sound, rhythm, the colour effects of harmony and discord, the suggestive significance of music, the whole sensuality of this art which Wagner made prevail--it is all this that Wagner derived, developed, and drew out of music.
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.
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844.
Page 170
He who thinks over the question of how the type man may be elevated to its highest glory and power, will realise from the start that he must place himself beyond morality; for morality was directed in its essentials at the opposite goal--that is to say, its aim was to arrest and to annihilate that glorious development wherever it was in process of accomplishment.
Page 172
The temporary preponderance of social valuations is both comprehensible and useful; it is a matter of building a _foundation_ upon which a _stronger_ species will ultimately be made possible.
Page 181
All passions are generally _useful,_ some directly, others indirectly; in regard to utility it is absolutely impossible to fix upon any gradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general may be regarded as good (_i.
Page 185
--We are capable of _otium,_ of the unconditional conviction that although a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly reduces one's rank.
Page 187
_The two paths.
Page 188
The aspect of the European of to-day makes me very hopeful.
Page 190
For in the Old World, as a matter of fact, a different and more lordly morality ruled than that of to-day; and the man of antiquity, under the educational ban of his morality, was a stronger and deeper man than the man of to-day--up to the present he has been the only well-constituted man.
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_--After having tried for.
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1008.