Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Part 1 Complete Works, Volume Six

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 56

an action following and resulting from his
convictions, and in the same way the Inquisition had a good right;
only the ruling views were false, and produced a result which seems
hard to us because those views have now grown strange to us. Besides,
what is the burning of a single individual compared with eternal
pains of hell for almost all! And yet this idea was universal at that
time, without essentially injuring by its dreadfulness the conception
of a God. With us, too, political sectarians are hardly and cruelly
treated, but because one is accustomed to believe in the necessity of
the State, the cruelty is not so deeply felt here as it is where we
repudiate the views. Cruelty to animals in children and Italians is
due to ignorance, _i.e._ the animal, through the interests of Church
teaching, has been placed too far behind man. Much that is dreadful and
inhuman in history, much that one hardly likes to believe, is mitigated
by the reflection that the one who commands and the one who carries
out are different persons,--the former does not behold the right and
therefore does not experience the strong impression on the imagination;
the latter obeys a superior and therefore feels no responsibility. Most
princes and military heads, through lack of imagination, easily appear
hard and cruel without really being so. _Egoism is not evil,_ because
the idea of the "neighbour"--the word is of Christian origin and does
not represent the truth--is very weak in us; and we feel ourselves
almost as free and irresponsible towards him as towards plants and
stones. We have yet to _learn_ that others suffer, and this can never
be completely learnt.


"MAN ALWAYS ACTS RIGHTLY."--We do not complain of nature as immoral
because it sends a thunderstorm and makes us wet,--why do we call those
who injure us immoral? Because in the latter case we take for granted
a free will functioning voluntarily; in the former we see necessity.
But this distinction is an error. Thus we do not call even intentional
injury immoral in all circumstances; for instance, we kill a fly
unhesitatingly and intentionally, only because its buzzing annoys us;
we punish a criminal intentionally and hurt him in order to protect
ourselves and society. In the first case it is the individual who, in
order to preserve himself, or even to protect himself from worry, does
intentional injury; in the second case it is the State. All morals
allow intentional injury _in the case of necessity,_ that is, when
it is a matter of _self-preservation_! But these two points of view
suffice to explain

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Text Comparison with The Will to Power, Book III and IV An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values

Page 13
If the proposition be reduced to "Something is thought, therefore there are thoughts," the result is mere tautology; and precisely the one factor which is in question, the "_reality_ of thought," is not touched upon,--so that, in this form, the apparitional character of thought cannot be denied.
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I notice something, and try to discover the reason of it: originally this was, I look for an _intention_ behind it, and, above all, I look for one who has an intention, for a subject, an agent: every phenomenon is an action, formerly intentions were seen behind _all_ phenomena, this is our oldest habit.
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The concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint.
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The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil, degrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed.
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Ought one to suppose that the question of rank between these two types can be at all doubtful? 858.
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life, in so far as it would overcome vital types.
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The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts "useful" and "harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of view of a community which is only able to see and survey _immediate and proximate_ consequences.
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--We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we do as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among equals (alas! this will not be realised for some time to come), --We are ironical towards the "gifted"; we hold the belief that no morality is possible without good birth.
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Fundamental concept: the new values must first be created--this remains _our duty_! The philosopher must be our lawgiver.
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For the former involves _independence_; but without intellectual greatness independence should not be allowed; all it does is to create disasters even in its lust of well-doing and of practising "justice.
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To have travelled over the whole circumference of the modern soul, and to have sat in all its corners--my ambition, my torment, and my happiness.