Ecce Homo Complete Works, Volume Seventeen

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 20



Why do I know more things than other people? Why, in fact, am I so
clever? I have never pondered over questions that are not questions. I
have never squandered my strength. Of actual religious difficulties,
for instance, I have no experience. I have never known what it is to
feel "sinful." In the same way I completely lack any reliable criterion
for ascertaining what constitutes a prick of conscience: from all
accounts a prick of conscience does not seem to be a very estimable
thing.... Once it was done I should hate to leave an action of mine
in the lurch; I should prefer completely to omit the evil outcome,
the consequences, from the problem concerning the value of an action.
In the face of evil consequences one is too ready to lose the proper
standpoint from which one's deed ought to be considered. A prick of
conscience strikes me as a sort of "evil eye." Something that has
failed should be honoured all the more jealously, precisely because
it has failed--this is much more in keeping with my morality.--"God,"
"the immortality of the soul," "salvation," a "beyond"--to all these
notions, even as a child, I never paid any attention whatsoever, nor
did I waste any time upon them,--maybe I was never _naif_ enough for
that?--I am quite unacquainted with atheism as a result, and still
less as an event in my life: in me it is inborn, instinctive. I am
too inquisitive, too incredulous, too high spirited, to be satisfied
with such a palpably clumsy solution of things. God is a too palpably
clumsy solution of things; a solution which shows a lack of delicacy
towards us thinkers--at bottom He is really no more than a coarse
and rude _prohibition_ of us: ye shall not think!... I am much more
interested in another question,--a question upon which the "salvation
of humanity" depends to a far greater degree than it does upon any
piece of theological curiosity: I refer to nutrition. For ordinary
purposes, it may be formulated as follows: "How precisely must _thou_
feed thyself in order to attain to thy maximum of power, or _virtù_
in the Renaissance style,--of virtue free from moralic acid?" My
experiences in regard to this matter have been as bad as they possibly
could be; I am surprised that I set myself this question so late in
life, and that it took me so long to draw "rational" conclusions
from my experiences. Only the absolute worth-_1_ lessness of German
culture--its "idealism"--can to some extent explain how it was that
precisely in this matter I was

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Text Comparison with The Will to Power, Book III and IV An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values

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Insects likewise react in different ways to different colours: some like this shade, the others that.
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did not regard changes in ourselves merely as such, but as "things in themselves," which are strange to us, and which we only "perceive"; and we did _not_ class them as phenomena, but as Being, as "attributes"; and in addition we invented a creature to which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the _effect_ the _working cause,_ and _the latter_ we made _Being.
Page 41
But everything in regard to which the word "knowledge" has any sense at all, belongs to the realm of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity whereas, conversely, all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to the realm of qualities, _i.
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_Being_--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from "_living.
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The same amount of energy, at different stages of development, means different things.
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_ The popular belief in cause and.
Page 79
According to what standard is the objective value measured? According to the quantity of _increased_ and _more organised power_ alone.
Page 84
Page 105
Inability to offer any resistance to a stimulus, and the feeling that one must react to it: this excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all such systems of punishment and reform altogether senseless.
Page 107
My pretty radical note of interrogation in the case of all more modern laws of punishment is this: should not the punishment fit the crime?--for in your heart of hearts thus would you have it.
Page 135
This differentiates the artist from the layman (from the spectator of art): the latter reaches the height of his excitement in the mere act of apprehending: the former in giving--and in such a way that the antagonism between these two gifts is not only natural but even desirable.
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The will to appearance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming, and to change (to objective deception), is here regarded as more profound, as more primeval, as more metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to appearance: the latter is merely a form of the will to illusion.
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Class, rank, race, environment, accident--all these things are much more likely to be expressed in an action or deed than the "personality" of the doer.
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_ Although the universe is no longer a God, it must still be capable of the divine power of creating and transforming; it must forbid itself to relapse into any one of its previous forms; it must not only have the intention, but also the means, of avoiding any sort of repetition, every second of its existence, even, it must control every single one of its movements, with the view of avoiding goals, final states, and repetitions and all the other results of such an unpardonable and insane method of thought and desire.