Ainsi Parlait Zarathoustra

By Friedrich Nietzsche

Page 129

et se courber l'homme,
qui l'asservit et l'abaisse au-dessous du serpent et du cochon: jusqu'à
ce qu'enfin le grand mépris clame en lui.

Désir de dominer - c'est le terrible maître qui enseigne le grand
mépris, qui prêche en face des villes et des empires: "Ote-toi!" -
jusqu'à ce qu'enfin ils s'écrient eux-mêmes: "Que je m'ôte _moi_!"

Désir de dominer - qui monte aussi vers les purs et les solitaires pour
les attirer, qui monte vers les hauteurs de la satisfaction de soi,
ardent comme un amour qui trace sur le ciel d'attirantes joies
empourprées.

Désir de dominer - mais qui voudrais appeler cela un _désir_, quand
c'est vers en bas que la hauteur aspire à la puissance! En vérité, il
n'y a rien de fiévreux et de maladif dans de pareils désirs, dans de
pareilles descentes!

Que la hauteur solitaire ne s'esseule pas éternellement et ne se
contente pas de soi; que la montagne descende vers la vallée et les
vents des hauteurs vers les terrains bas: - O qui donc trouverait le
vrai nom pour baptiser et honorer un pareil désir! "Vertu qui donne" -
c'est ainsi que Zarathoustra appela jadis cette chose inexprimable.

Et c'est alors qu'il arriva aussi - et, en vérité, ce fut pour la
première fois! - que sa parole fit la louange de _l'égoïsme_, le bon et
sain égoïsme qui jaillit de l'âme puissante: - de l'âme puissante, unie
au corps élevé, au corps beau, victorieux et réconfortant, autour de
qui toute chose devient miroir: - le corps souple qui persuade, le
danseur dont le symbole et l'expression est l'âme joyeuse d'elle-même.
La joie égoïste de tels corps, de telles âmes s'appelle elle-même:
"vertu".

Avec ce qu'elle dit du bon et du mauvais, cette joie égoïste se protège
elle-même, comme si elle s'entourait d'un bois sacré; avec les noms de
son bonheur, elle bannit loin d'elle tout ce qui est méprisable.

Elle bannit loin d'elle tout ce qui est lâche; elle dit: mauvais -
_c'est ce qui est_ lâche! Méprisable luit semble celui qui peine,
soupire et se plaint toujours et qui ramasse même les plus petits
avantages.

Elle méprise aussi toute sagesse lamentable: car, en vérité, il y a
aussi la sagesse qui fleurit dans l'obscurité; une sagesse d'ombre
nocturne qui soupire toujours: "Tout est vain!"

Elle ne tient pas en estime la craintive méfiance et ceux qui veulent
des serments au lieu de regards et de mains tendues: et non plus la
sagesse trop méfiante, - car c'est ainsi que font les âmes lâches.

L'obséquieux lui paraît plus bas encore, le chien qui se met tout de
suite

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Text Comparison with The Genealogy of Morals The Complete Works, Volume Thirteen, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy.

Page 11
In the word κακός as in δειλός (the plebeian in contrast to the ἀγαθός) the cowardice is emphasised.
Page 23
A quantum of force is just such a quantum of movement, will, action--rather it is nothing else than just those very phenomena of moving, willing, acting, and can only appear otherwise in the misleading errors of language (and the fundamental fallacies of reason which have become petrified therein), which understands, and understands wrongly, all working as conditioned by a worker, by a "subject.
Page 28
_" _Per fidem_: so stands it written.
Page 34
"How is a memory to be made for the man-animal? How is an impression to be so deeply fixed upon this ephemeral understanding, half dense, and half silly, upon this incarnate forgetfulness, that it will be permanently present?" As one may imagine, this primeval problem was not solved by exactly gentle answers and gentle means; perhaps there is nothing more awful and more sinister in the early history of man than his _system of mnemonics_.
Page 35
these things originate from that instinct which found in pain its most potent mnemonic.
Page 36
It stands to reason that this must needs produce results which are removed from the truth by something more than a respectful distance.
Page 37
5.
Page 41
What, do you think, was the mood with which Homer makes his gods look down upon the fates of men? What final meaning have at bottom the Trojan War and similar tragic horrors? It is impossible to entertain any doubt on the point: they were intended as festival games for the gods, and, in so far as the poet is of a more godlike breed than other men, as festival games also for the poets.
Page 65
--Am I not understood?--Have I not been understood?--"Certainly not, sir?"--Well, let us begin at the beginning.
Page 70
" Let us think all the better of the innocence of our æsthetes, reflected as it is in such arguments; let us, for instance, count to Kant's honour the country-parson naïveté of his doctrine concerning the peculiar character of the sense of touch! And here we come back to Schopenhauer, who stood in much closer neighbourhood to the arts than did Kant, and yet never escaped outside the pale of the Kantian definition; how was that? The circumstance is marvellous enough: he interprets the expression, "without interest," in the most personal fashion, out of an experience which must in his case have been part and parcel of his regular routine.
Page 91
" What was done was to make the sick _harmless_ up to a certain point, to destroy the incurable by means of themselves, to turn the milder cases severely on to themselves, to give their resentment a backward direction ("man needs but one thing"), and to _exploit_ similarly the bad instincts of all sufferers with a view to self-discipline, self-surveillance, self-mastery.
Page 92
congestion and organisation of the sick (the word "Church" is the most popular name for it): on the other, a kind of provisional safeguarding of the comparatively healthy, the more perfect specimens, the cleavage of a _rift_ between healthy and sick--for a long time that was all! and it was much! it was very much! I am proceeding, as you see, in this essay, from an hypothesis which, as far as such readers as I want are concerned, does not require to be proved; the hypothesis that "sinfulness" in man is not an actual fact, but rather merely the interpretation of a fact, of a physiological discomfort,--a discomfort seen through a moral religious perspective which is no longer binding upon us.
Page 98
The guilty methods spell one thing: to produce _emotional excess_--which is used as the most efficacious anæsthetic against their depressing state of protracted pain; this is why priestly ingenuity has proved quite inexhaustible in thinking out this one question: "_By what means_ can you produce an emotional excess?" This sounds harsh: it is manifest that it would sound nicer and would grate on one's ears less, if I were to say, forsooth: "The ascetic priest made use at all times of the enthusiasm contained in all strong emotions.
Page 103
At the most you can merely draw a comparison with the specifically German influence: I mean the alcohol poisoning of Europe, which up to the present has kept pace exactly with the political and racial pre–dominance of the Germans (where they inoculated their blood, there too did they inoculate their vice).
Page 104
The Old Testament--yes, that is something quite different, all honour to the Old Testament! I find therein great men, an heroic landscape, and one of the rarest phenomena in the world, the incomparable naïveté _of the strong heart_; further still, I find a people.
Page 105
Well, he's done it.
Page 106
What is the significance of the _power_ of that ideal, the monstrousness of its power? Why is it given such an amount of scope? Why is not a better resistance offered against it? The ascetic ideal expresses one will: where is the opposition will, in which an opposition ideal expresses itself? The ascetic ideal has an aim-- this goal is, putting it generally, that all the other interests of human life should, measured by its standard, appear petty and narrow; it explains epochs, nations, men, in reference to this one end; it forbids any other interpretation, any other end; it repudiates, denies, affirms, confirms, only in the sense of its own interpretation (and was there ever a more thoroughly elaborated system of interpretation?); it subjects itself to no power, rather does it believe in its own precedence over every power--it believes that nothing powerful exists in the world that has not first got to receive from "it" a meaning, a right to exist, a value, as being an instrument in its work, a way and means to its end, to one end.
Page 114
the praise given to contemplation; oh, what a thirst do these sweet intellectuals excite even for ascetics and winter landscapes! Nay! The devil take these "contemplative" folk! How much liefer would I wander with those historical Nihilists through the gloomiest, grey, cold mist!––nay, I shall not mind listening (supposing I have to choose) to one who is completely unhistorical and anti-historical (a man, like Dühring for instance, over whose periods a hitherto shy and unavowed species of "beautiful souls" has grown intoxicated in contemporary Germany, _the species anarchistica_ within the educated proletariate).
Page 121
Mendelssohn, too, possesses distinction--like Goethe, in the most natural way in the world.
Page 123
Enough; here, as in other matters, the coming century will be found following in the footsteps of Napoleon--the first man, and the man of greatest initiative and advanced views, of modern times.